

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 STATE 197577
ORIGIN PM-05

INFO OCT-01 NEA-10 ISO-00 SIG-03 L-03 DODE-00 CIAE-00
INR-10 NSAE-00 SS-15 /047 R

DRAFTED BY PM/SAS:RWSMITH:GMH
APPROVED BY PM/SAS:AKOCHANЕК
L/PM:MR. BOREK
NEA/RA:COL.GROSS
NEA/ARP:MR.TWINAM
DOD/DSAA:MR.BECKER (SUBSTANCE)
DOD/ISA:LT.COL.PLUMMER (SUBSTANCE
-----105057 042308Z /66

O 042154Z AUG 78
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO USLO RIYADH IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE
CHUSMTM DHAHRAN
AMEMBASSY SANA
AMEMBASSY MANAMA
USMTM/DCR RIYADH
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 197577

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: MASS, SA, YE, US

SUBJECT: TRANSFER ASSURANCES

REF: RIYADH 627

1. WE APPRECIATE SAUDIS' CONCERN WITH WHAT THEY PERCEIVE
AS LOSS OF CONTROL OVER FUTURE DISPOSITION OF US-ORIGIN
DEFENSE ARTICLES BY YAR AND BAHRAIN. HOWEVER, THAT PER-
CEPTION EXAGGERATES NATURE OF USG CONTROL OVER THIRD-PARTY
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 STATE 197577

TRANSFERS. THAT CONTROL EXTENDS ONLY TO OUR CONSIDERATION
AND PROCESSING OF FORMAL REQUESTS BY RECIPIENT COUNTRIES TO
TRANSFER TO THIRD PARTIES CERTAIN DEFENSE ARTICLES, RE-
LATED TRAINING AND OTHER DEFENSE SERVICES. THE MAJOR
CRITERION GOVERNING OUR DECISIONS IN THESE CASES IS WHETHER
OR NOT THE US ITSELF WOULD AT THAT TIME TRANSFER THE SAME
ITEM TO THE COUNTRY CONCERNED. WE DO NOT NORMALLY BECOME

INVOLVED IN THIRD-PARTY TRANSFER CASES UNTIL WE RECEIVE THOSE FORMAL REQUESTS, BY WHICH TIME THE FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED HAVE PRESUMABLY DISCUSSED THE DEAL AND PERHAPS HAVE EVEN SIGNED CONTRACTS. WE DO NOT INITIATE, GUIDE, OR IMPLEMENT THIRD-PARTY TRANSFERS, AND WE DO NOT CONCERN OURSELVES WITH DETAILS SUCH AS PRICES, DELIVERY SCHEDULES, ETC. WE HAVE, AS A MATTER OF FACT, INFORMED THE CONGRESS IN THE PAST THAT THE FISCAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE DETAILS OF

THIRD-PARTY TRANSFERS ARE NONE OF OUR BUSINESS AND REMAIN MATTERS BETWEEN SOVEREIGN FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS. OUR CONTROL THEREFORE BECOMES SOLELY ONE OF APPROVAL OR DISAPPROVAL AND EVEN THAT IS DEPENDENT UPON THE EXISTENCE OF FRIENDLY DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS AT THE TIME A TRANSFER OCCURS.

2. SINCE SAUDIS ARE OBVIOUSLY INTERESTED IN CLOSER CONTROL OVER DISPOSITION AND USE OF US EQUIPMENT THAN CAN BE PROVIDED THROUGH TRANSFER ASSURANCES, THEY SHOULD WORK OUT SOME SORT OF BILATERAL ARRANGEMENTS WITH THE COUNTRIES CONCERNED AND THEIR FREEDOM TO DO SO IS IN NO WAY ABRIDGED BY THE EXECUTION OF THE REQUISITE BAHRAIN AND YEMEN ASSURANCES TO US. IT WOULD SEEM THAT THEIR CONTROL OF THE PURSE-STRINGS FOR THE PURCHASES SHOULD GIVE THEM ADEQUATE LEVERAGE TO DO THIS. THE SAG COULD THEN INCLUDE IN SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT ANY CONTROL MECHANISM THEY WISH, E.G., THAT SAUDI APPROVAL OF ANY FUTURE TRANSFERS WOULD BE CONDITIONED

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 STATE 197577

UPON THE YAR AND BAHRAIN INDEPENDENTLY REQUESTING AND OBTAINING ADVANCE USG APPROVAL. USG PARTICIPATION IN SUCH AN AGREEMENT WOULD CONSTITUTE AN UNWELCOME PRECEDENT AND INVOLVE US IN LOCAL AND REGIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS TO AN UNDESIRABLE EXTENT.

3. ACCORDINGLY, WE CANNOT ACCEPT TRANSFER ASSURANCES ADDRESSED TO BOTH THE USG AND SAG AS DISCUSSED IN THE FIRST SOLUTION PROPOSED IN REFTEL. WE WOULD HAVE NO OBJECTIONS SHOULD THE YAR AND BAHRAIN AGREE TO PROVIDE SIMILAR ASSURANCES TO THE SAG IN A SEPARATE DOCUMENT, AS IN THE SECOND SOLUTION. THE USG COULD NOT ACCEPT ANY MIDDLEMAN ROLE IN THE TRANSACTION.

4. ABOVE POINTS SHOULD BE CONVEYED TO APPROPRIATE SAUDI AUTHORITIES AND EMPHASIZED IN AUGUST 6 MEETINGS. IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT THESE DIFFICULTIES BE OVERCOME, ESPECIALLY IN THE CASE OF THE F-5BS FOR YEMEN, IF WE ARE TO PROCEED EFFICIENTLY TOWARD THEIR AVAILABILITY FOR SEPTEMBER 26 PARADE. YOU SHOULD ALSO EMPHASIZE THAT THE ABOVE REFLECTS OUR POSITION ON ALL THIRD-PARTY TRANSFERS, PRESENT AND FUTURE. VANCE

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 jan 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: ARMS TRANSPORT RESTRICTIONS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 04 aug 1978
Decaption Date: 01 jan 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 20 Mar 2014
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1978STATE197577
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: RWSMITH:GMH
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D780320-0019
Format: TEL
From: STATE
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1978/newtext/t19780896/aaaadctf.tel
Line Count: 116
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: b3911d68-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ORIGIN PM
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 3
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: 78 RIYADH 627
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 06 jul 2005
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 1831413
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: TRANSFER ASSURANCES
TAGS: MASS, PCAT, SA, YE, US
To: RIYADH
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/b3911d68-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Sheryl P. Walter
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
20 Mar 2014
Markings: Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014